The Texas City refinery explosion, 20 years later
How good Process Safety Management keeps it in the pipe, protects people, and preserves the environment
On March 23, 2005, a catastrophic explosion at BP’s Texas City refinery claimed 15 lives, injured 180 others, and sent shockwaves through the oil and gas industry 1. The blast, which could be heard for miles, wasn’t just a tragic accident--it was a preventable disaster rooted in systemic failures of process safety management (PSM) 1. Nearly 20 years later, the lessons from Texas City remain a powerful reminder of why PSM is non-negotiable. This article explores those lessons, drawing from key reports by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB), OSHA, and the EPA, to show how robust PSM practices are essential for keeping processes contained, protecting workers, and safeguarding the environment.
A Perfect Storm
The Texas City disaster occurred during the startup of the isomerization (ISOM) unit, a process designed to boost gasoline octane 1. A raffinate splitter tower was overfilled, causing flammable liquids to escape through a blowdown stack—a 1950s-era design lacking a modern flare system 2. The released hydrocarbons formed a vapor cloud, which ignited, likely from a nearby running vehicle 2. The explosion obliterated temporary trailers where contractors were working, killing 15 and injuring many more 1.
The CSB’s investigation revealed a cascade of PSM failures 1:
The blowdown stack was obsolete and hadn’t been upgraded to safer standards 2. Even before BP acquired the refinery, recommendations and an OSHA citation to replace the blowdown drums were not fully implemented 3.
Critical alarms and level sensors were malfunctioning, leaving operators unaware of the danger. OSHA later cited BP for 439 willful PSM violations in 2009, many tied to neglected pressure relief systems 4.
BP’s emphasis on cost-cutting and minor injury metrics (like slips and falls) overshadowed catastrophic process risks 3. After merging with Amoco, BP demanded a 25% budget cut, impacting safety resources 3.
Organizational breakdowns, from refinery management to corporate leadership, allowed these hazards to persist 1.
Texas City wasn’t an isolated mishap--it was a glaring example of what happens when PSM is sidelined.
Refinery injures 36 and pays $550 million for using old operating procedures
What Is PSM, and Why Does It Matter?
Process safety management is a disciplined framework for identifying, evaluating, and controlling hazards in industries that handle hazardous chemicals. Unlike occupational safety, which focuses on individual worker protection, PSM targets the big-picture risks… think fires, explosions, or toxic releases… that can harm multiple people, damage facilities, and devastate the environment.
At its heart, PSM is about keeping it in the pipe. When processes are well-managed, hazardous materials stay contained within equipment, ensuring operations run smoothly and safely. But when PSM is not well-managed, the consequences can ripple far beyond the facility, as Texas City painfully proved.
The PSM Breakdown at Texas City
Reports from the CSB, OSHA, and EPA pinpointed how PSM failures fueled the disaster 1:
Mechanical Integrity (MI): This PSM cornerstone ensures equipment is properly designed, maintained, and operated. At Texas City, the blowdown stack was outdated, and broken safety instruments left operators in the dark. OSHA later cited BP for 439 willful PSM violations in 2009, many related to the failure to follow industry-accepted engineering practices for pressure relief safety systems 4.
Management of Change (MOC): PSM demands thorough review of process or equipment changes. BP, however, had implemented modifications without proper MOC procedures, amplifying risks.
Training and Competency: Operators weren’t adequately trained to handle abnormal situations. The CSB noted that budget cuts had gutted training programs, leaving workers unprepared 3.
Safety Culture: BP’s fixation on minor injuries created a false sense of security, while process safety was deprioritized. The CSB summed it up: “BP mistook good intentions for effective performance” 1.
These lapses didn’t just jeopardize workers--they undermined the entire operation.
Good PSM is the Foundation of Reliability and Safety
The Texas City explosion drives home a vital lesson: good PSM is good business. When processes are safely managed, they’re more reliable, less prone to disruption, and far less likely to harm people or the planet. Here’s how PSM delivers:
Effective PSM prevents leaks and releases. At Texas City, a modern flare system could have safely burned off the escaped hydrocarbons, averting the vapor cloud. Instead, neglected equipment and poor maintenance let the process spiral out of control.
PSM prioritizes human safety. Placing temporary trailers near hazardous units--a basic PSM violation--cost 15 lives 1. Good PSM ensures occupied areas are kept far from high-risk zones.
While the explosion itself didn’t trigger a major spill, the EPA’s post-incident scrutiny highlighted broader environmental risks at the refinery 8. A settlement with the EPA required BP to implement pollution controls, including reducing benzene and HCFC emissions and improving asbestos waste management 8. Robust PSM includes safeguards to prevent pollution of air, water, and soil.
Beyond prevention, PSM enhances reliability. A well-maintained process avoids unplanned shutdowns, reduces costs, and protects both people and profits. Texas City showed what’s at stake when PSM is ignored—good practices turn that risk into resilience.
A Long Road to Recovery
After the explosion, BP faced severe repercussions. OSHA initially levied a record fine of $21 million in 2005 4. Following a 2009 investigation, OSHA proposed an additional $87.43 million in penalties for hundreds of safety violations 5. BP ultimately paid a record $50.6 million in 2010 to settle some of these violations 10. In 2012, another settlement required BP to pay over $13 million to resolve the majority of the remaining willful violations 4. As part of these agreements, BP was mandated to hire independent experts to monitor safety efforts and allocate at least $500 million for safety upgrades 4. The EPA also required $161 million in pollution controls and maintenance upgrades 8. BP sold the refinery to Marathon Petroleum in 2013, but safety issues persisted, with later reports flagging ongoing PSM concerns.
The disaster also sparked broader change. The CSB pushed for stronger PSM regulations 13, and the Baker Panel, commissioned by BP, urged a safety culture overhaul, emphasizing improvements in safety leadership, management systems, expertise, culture, accountability, and oversight 14. Yet, some recommendations remain unmet in 2024, underscoring the challenge of fully embracing PSM. Furthermore, numerous lawsuits related to the explosion and subsequent chemical releases indicate the lasting impact on the community 12. The CSB has also expressed concerns that the safety improvements implemented may still be insufficient to prevent future disasters 13.
Prior Warning Signs
Tragically, the Texas City explosion was not entirely unforeseen. Investigations revealed numerous prior incidents and warning signs that highlighted the deteriorating safety conditions at the refinery 3. When BP acquired the facility in 1999, it was already in poor repair, and essential upgrades had been repeatedly delayed 3. Following the merger with Amoco, drastic budget cuts led to a reduction in safety personnel, training, and equipment 3. A 2002 safety audit raised serious concerns about the potential for a major incident due to frequent hydrocarbon releases and overdue inspections 3. Even more alarmingly, a safety audit just before the 2005 explosion indicated that many employees harbored a significant fear of a catastrophic event 3. Refinery management themselves acknowledged key risks in March 2005, including a fear of underreporting safety incidents and a grim prediction of a potential fatality 3. The occurrence of over 80 hydrocarbon releases in the years leading up to the explosion further underscored the escalating safety risks 3. These numerous red flags represent missed opportunities to address the systemic PSM failures that ultimately led to the devastating explosion.
Could a robust PSM program have prevented the Deepwater Horizon disaster?
Prevention Beats Disaster
Texas City teaches us that PSM isn’t a luxury… it’s a necessity. Industries handling hazardous materials must embed process safety into their operations, not just for compliance, but to protect their workforce, assets, and surroundings.
Key takeaways include:
Invest in Maintenance: Safety systems must be routinely checked and modernized. Skimping on upkeep invites catastrophe.
Build a Safety Culture: Leadership must champion process safety over short-term gains. A low injury rate is meaningless if major risks loom.
Train Workers Thoroughly: Operators need the skills and confidence to act decisively when trouble arises.
Heed Warning Signs: Texas City had prior incidents—each a missed chance to fix PSM gaps 3.
Good PSM is a commitment--to reliability, to containment, to safety, and to environmental stewardship.
A Call to Action
Almost two decades after Texas City, the stakes remain high. PSM saves lives, keeps processes humming, and prevents environmental harm. But it demands effort, resources, and a culture that puts safety first. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board emphasizes that ongoing vigilance and improvements in safety regulations are still needed to prevent similar disasters 13.
For industries worldwide, the choice is obvious: prioritize PSM now, or pay a far steeper price later. Let’s keep it in the pipe--and keep everyone safe.
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Sources
-(https://www.csb.gov/bp-america-texas-city-refinery-explosion/) 1
-(https://www.osha.gov/dep/bp/bp.html)
-(https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/bp-texas-city-clean-air-act-settlement) 8
-(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_City_refinery_explosion) 2
-(https://www.zehllaw.com/10-years-after-bp-texas-city-refinery-explosion-safety-improvements-still-needed/) 13
-(https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/07122012) 4
-(https://risktec.tuv.com/knowledge-bank/texas-city-refinery-explosion-findings-from-the-independent-safety-review-panel/) 14
-(https://www.propublica.org/article/blast-at-bp-texas-refinery-in-05-foreshadowed-gulf-disaster) 3
-(https://maritime-executive.com/article/bp-pay-506-million-record-osha-fine) 10
-(https://www.propublica.org/article/bp-agrees-to-pay-50-million-for-earlier-texas-city-problems) 11
-(https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/osha/osha20091029)
-(https://abrahamwatkins.com/articles/more-trouble-for-bp-fines-and-lawsuits-over-refinery-calamities/) 7
-(https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/seven-years-later-bp-still-paying-for-texas-refinery-violations/) 9
-(https://www.ttla.com/?pg=OSHAFactSheetonBP2009MonitoringInspection) 5
-(https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/07/12/bp-settles-with-osha-13-million-for-texas-city-refinery-explosion/) 12
Yes, there are some regulations that are both necessary and reasonable.